

Voting with a Logarithmic Number of Cards

<u>Takaaki Mizuki</u>, Isaac Kobina Asiedu, Hideaki Sone Tohoku University








✓ There are 2 candidates and n voters.



2 candidates



election



n voters




- ✓ There are 2 candidates and n voters.
- ✓ Usually, n ballot papers are required.



2 candidates




election





- ✓ There are 2 candidates and n voters.
- ✓ Usually, n ballot papers are required.
- ✓ We show $O(\log n)$ cards conduct an election.



Contents




- 1. Introduction
- 2. Known Protocols
- 3. Voting with a Logarithmic Number of Cards
- 4. New Adder Protocols
- 5. Conclusion

Contents



1. Introduction

- 2. Knol rotocols
- 1.1 Computation Using a Deck of Cards1.2 History of Card-Based Protocols1.3 Our Results
- 4. New Adder Protocols
- 5. Conclusion




a deck cards

In this paper, we use a deck of *cards*.





























face-up



turn over

?

?

?


?

?

?

face-down





How to implement voting? The simplest way is as follows.

1. Distribute two cards of different suits to each voter.








n voters







1. Distribute two cards of different suits to each voter.




- 1. Distribute two cards of different suits to each voter.
- 2. Each voter privately commits his/her ballot according to the encoding.




- 1. Distribute two cards of different suits to each voter.
- 2. Each voter privately commits his/her ballot.
- 3. Shuffle all left cards and reveal them.




- 1. Distribute two cards of different suits to each voter.
- 2. Each voter privately commits his/her.
- 3. Shuffle all left cards and reveal them.






- 1. Distribute two cards of different suits to each voter.
- 2. Each voter privately commits his/her.
- 3. Shuffle all left cards and reveal them.




- 1. Distribute two cards of different suits to each voter.
- 2. Each voter privately commits his/her.
- 3. Shuffle all left cards and reveal them.





n voters



✓ Voting can be naively done using 2n cards.



n voters



- ✓ Voting can be naively done using 2n cards.
- ✓ This paper shows that, by applying cardbased cryptographic protocols, O(log n) cards can also conduct voting.




Card-based protocols provide secure computation.






Card-based protocols provide secure computation.

To deal with Boolean values, this encoding is used:









To deal with Boolean values, this encoding is used:



$$= 0$$





A *commitment* to a bit $x \in \{0,1\}$ is





? of two face-down cards

holding the value of \mathcal{X} .



To deal with Boolean values, this encoding is used:







A *commitment* to a bit $x \in \{0,1\}$ is





a pair ? ? of two face-down cards


holding the value of \mathcal{X} .
















With keeping the value of x secret, we can get a commitment to the negation \overline{x} of x.




With keeping the value of x secret, we can get a commitment to the negation \overline{x} of x.

Secure NOT operation is trivial.




With keeping the value of x secret, we can get a commitment to the negation \overline{x} of x.

- > Secure **NOT** operation is trivial.
- > How about secure AND operation?




➤ How about secure **AND** operation?



$$\begin{array}{c|c} ? ? \\ \hline a \\ b \\ \hline \end{array}$$

With keeping the values of a and b secret, we want to get a commitment to $a \land b$.



➤ How about secure **AND** operation?

$$| \bullet | = 1$$


$$\begin{array}{c|c} ? ? \\ \hline a \\ b \\ \hline \end{array}$$

With keeping the values of a and b secret, we want to get a commitment to $a \wedge b$.

There have been such four protocols in the literatures.

History of Secure AND protocols





AND	required cards	avg. # of trials
Crepeau-Kilian [CRYPTO '93]	10	6
Niemi-Renvall [TCS, 1998]	12	2.5
Stiglic [TCS, 2001]	8	2
Mizuki-Sone [FAW 2009]	6	1

History of Secure AND protocols





AND	required cards	avg. # of trials	
Crepeau-Kilian [CRYPTO '93]	10	6 Vill be	
Niemi-Renvall [TCS, 1998]	12 intro	oduced in ction 2.2	
Stiglic [TCS, 2001]	8	2	
Mizuki-Sone [FAW 2009]	6	1	

History of Secure XOR protocols





XOR	# of required cards	# of types	avg. # of trials
Crepeau-Kilian [CRYPTO '93]	14	4	6
Mizuki, et. al [AJoC, 2006]	10	2	2
Mizuki-Sone [FAW 2009]	4	2	1

History of Secure XOR protocols






XOR		Will be	in #		
Crepeau-Kilian [CRYPTO '93]	1/	introduced in Section 2.3			
Mizuki, et. al [AJoC. 2006]	10	2	2		
Mizuki-Sone [FAW 2009]	4	2	1		

Existing COPY protocols







Make identical copies of a commitment.

Existing COPY protocols







Make identical copies of a commitment.

















Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols





Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols




Applying a half adder





Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols


Devising a tailor-made half adder






Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols


Devising a tailor-made half adder







Devising a tailor-made half adder



Contents



1. Introduction

2. Known Protocols

3.

with a Logarithmic


- 2.1 Random Bisection Cuts
- 2.2 Six-Card AND Protocol
- 2.3 Four-Card XOR Protocol
- 2.4 Copy Protocol with a Random Bisection Cut

2.1 Random Bisection Cuts




a random bisection cut

Bisect a given deck of cards, and then randomly switch the resulting two portions:




prob. 1/2
??????
not switched






a random bisection cut

Bisect a given deck of cards, and then randomly switch the resulting two portions:



prob. 1/2
? ? ? ?

not switched




easy-to-implement card shuffling operation


2.2 Six-Card AND Protocol





Secure AND can be done with 6 cards [6].



[6] T. Mizuki and H. Sone, Six-Card Secure AND and Four-Card Secure XOR, FAW 2009, LNCS 5598, pp. 358–369, 2009.












Arrange 2 commitments and 2 additional cards:



























Turn over the rightmost two cards:



They become a commitment to 0.











Rearrange the positions:



















prob. of 1/2





prob. of 1/2









(b)

















Rearrange the positions:
















































where $r \in \{0,1\}$ is a random bit.














where $r \in \{0,1\}$ is a random bit.

































$$=a \wedge b$$


$$a \oplus r = 1$$
, i.e., $a = \overline{r}$

















2.3 Four-Card XOR Protocol




Secure XOR can be done with 4 cards [6].



[6] T. Mizuki and H. Sone, Six-Card Secure AND and Four-Card Secure XOR, FAW 2009, LNCS 5598, pp. 358–369, 2009.







2.4 Copy Protocol with a Random Bisection Cut



Making a copy can be done with 4 additional cards [6].



[6] T. Mizuki and H. Sone, Six-Card Secure AND and Four-Card Secure XOR, FAW 2009, LNCS 5598, pp. 358–369, 2009.



Contents




- 1. Introduction
- 2. Known Protocols
- 3. Voting with a Logarithmic Number of Cards
- 4. New Adder Protocols
- 5. Conclusion




Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols

Devising a tailor-made half adder






Half adder





Half adder








Remember that

- ✓ AND can be done with 6 cards;
- ✓ XOR can be done with 4 cards;
- ✓ COPY can be done with 4 additional cards.




- ✓ AND can be done with 6 cards;
- ✓ XOR can be done with 4 cards;
- ✓ COPY can be done with 4 additional cards.






- ✓ AND can be done with 6 cards;
- ✓ XOR can be done with 4 cards;
- ✓ COPY can be done with 4 additional cards.






- ✓ AND can be done with 6 cards;
- ✓ XOR can be done with 4 cards;
- ✓ COPY can be done with 4 additional cards.






- ✓ AND can be done with 6 cards;
- ✓ XOR can be done with 4 cards;
- ✓ COPY can be done with 4 additional cards.








- ✓ XOR can be done with 4 cards;
- ✓ COPY can be done with 4 additional cards.






- ✓ AND can be done with 6 cards;
- ✓ XOR can be done with 4 cards;
- ✓ COPY can be done with 4 additional cards.





Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols


Devising a tailor-made half adder







Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols


Devising a tailor-made half adder










 $2\lceil \log n \rceil + 8 \text{ cards}$





encoding for candidates















Apply a half adder







binary representation of $x_1 + x_2$







of $x_1 + x_2$






Apply a half adder (and XOR)







binary representation of $x_1 + x_2 + x_3$




For example, if $x_1 = x_2 = x_3 = 1$, then




binary representation of $x_1 + x_2 + x_3$























of
$$x_1 + x_2 + x_3$$












•••



$2\lceil \log n \rceil$ cards













binary representation

of
$$x_1 + \cdots + x_{n-1}$$















$2\lceil \log n \rceil$ cards

























binary representation

of
$$x_1 + \cdots + x_{n-1}$$
















$2\lceil \log n \rceil + 2 \text{ (or } 2\lceil \log n \rceil \text{) cards}$
















binary representation

of
$$x_1 + \cdots + x_n$$



Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols

Devising a tailor-made half adder



Contents





- 1. Introduction
- 2. Known Protocols
- 3. Voting with a Logarithmic Number of Cards
- 4. New Adder Protocols
- 5. Conclusion




Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols


Devising a tailor-made half adder




























Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols


Devising a tailor-made half adder





Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols


Devising a tailor-made half adder





Using existing AND/XOR/COPY protocols

Devising a tailor-made half adder




Contents



- 1. Introduction
- 2. Known Protocols
- 3. Voting with a Logarithmic Number of Cards
- 4. New Adder Protocols
- 5. Conclusion

We gave a 8-card secure half adder protocol.





It enables us to conduct voting with $2\lceil \log n \rceil + 6$ cards.







I hope card-based protocols would help you with

- intuitive explanation of crypto. to non-specialists
- education in classroom.

That's all. Thank you for your attention.

A (real) deck of cards available to the first several people; please contact the speaker.



